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Autistic expertise: A critical reflection on the production of 
knowledge in autism studies 
Damian E M Milton 
 





The field of autism studies is a highly disputed territory within which competing contradictory 
discourses abound. In this field, it is the voices and claims of autistic people regarding their 
own expertise in knowledge production concerning autism that is most recent in the debate, 
and traditionally the least attended to. In this article, I utilise the theories of Harry Collins and 
colleagues in order to reflect upon and conceptualise the various claims to knowledge 
production and expertise within the field of autism studies, from the perspective of an author 
who has been diagnosed as being on the autism spectrum. The notion that autistic people 
lack sociality is problematised, with the suggestion that autistic people are not well described 
E\QRWLRQVVXFKDVWKHµVRFLDOEUDLQ¶RUDVSRVVHVVLQJµ]HURGHJUHHVRIFRJQLWLYHHPSDWK\¶,
then argue, however, that there is a qualitative difference in autistic sociality, and question to 
what extent such differences are of a biological or cultural nature, and to what extent 
interactional expertise can be gained by both parties in interactions between autistic and 
non-autistic people. In conclusion, I argue that autistic people have often become distrustful 
of researchers and their aims, and are frequently frozen out of the processes of knowledge 
production. Such a context results in a negative feedback spiral with further damage to the 
growth of interactional expertise between researchers and autistic people, and a breakdown 
in trust and communication leading to an increase in tension between stakeholder groups. 
The involvement of autistic scholars in research and improvements in participatory methods 
can thus be seen as a requirement, if social research in the field of autism is to claim ethical 
and epistemological integrity. 
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Introduction 
Reflecting upon investigations carried out during doctoral research that concerned the 
discourses produced by various stakeholders regarding the education of autistic people, a 
range of views and opinions was being voiced by practitioners, academics from various 
disciplines, parents and autistic people themselves, and some clear trends have emerged 
(Milton, 2011, Milton, 2012c). These trends indicate a wide divide in outlook between the 
various personal deficit models of autism often favoured by practitioners and certain 
academics (Frith, 1989; Happe, 1994), and a more sociologically situated model of autism 
often followed by autistic people themselves (Arnold, 2010; Graby, 2012, Milton, 2012b). 
 
The field of autism studies is a highly disputed territory with competing contradictory 
discourses abounding. Within this disputed territory, however, it has been the voice and 
assertion of autistic people themselves to claims of expertise in knowledge production that is 
most recent in the debate, and traditionally the least listened to (Milton and Bracher, 2013). 
This article utilises the theories of Harry Collins and his colleagues (Collins, 2004, 2010, 
2011; Collins et al., 2006; Collins and Evans, 2007) in order to reflect upon and 
conceptualise the various claims to knowledge production and expertise within the field of 
autism studies.  
 
7KHDUWLFOHSURFHHGV LQ VL[VHFWLRQV7KHVHFWLRQ µ$ IUDPHZRUN WRFRQFHSWXDOLVHH[SHUWLVH¶
outlines the framework for conceptualising the acquisition of knowledge and expertise by 
&ROOLQVDQG(YDQV 7KLVVHFWLRQ WKHQ LQWURGXFHV WKH WHUPRI µLQWHUDFWLRQDOH[SHUWLVH¶
and asks to what extent such mutual understanding is achievable between autistic and non-
autistic people. This framework was originally devised to indicate that the kind of expertise 
HPSOR\HG E\ VSHFLDOLVWV LV RIWHQ RI D VRFLDOO\ VLWXDWHG QDWXUH 7KH VHFWLRQ µ3RSXODU
XQGHUVWDQGLQJV¶ VKRZV KRZ VXFK D IUDPHZRUN FDQ DFFRXQW IRU VRPH RI WKe popular 
understandings (and misunderstandings) that can be seen in the field of autism for those 
ZKR GR QRW KDYH DFFHVV WR VXFK VSHFLDOLVW SUDFWLFHV ,Q WKH VHFWLRQ µ7KH ³PDFKLQH-OLNH´
PHWDSKRU¶ WKH µPDFKLQHOLNH¶ PHWDSKRU RIWHQ XVHG WR GHVFULEH DXWLVWLF cognition and 
knowledge acquisition is critiqued utilising this conceptual framework, and an argument put 
forward that autistic people (across the spectrum) are indeed social beings, albeit perhaps a 
more idiosyncratic or outsider social experience and expressions of social agency. This 
DUJXPHQW LVFRQWLQXHGLQWKHVHFWLRQµ$XWLVPDQGWKHDFTXLVLWLRQRI WDFLWNQRZOHGJH¶ZKLFK
explores in depth the ways in which knowledge can be acquired, and how autistic people 
cannot be said to totally lack such forms of knowledge. This section finishes with a critique of 
educational methods for autistic people that break down social information into explicit 
µUXOHV¶ 7KH VHFWLRQ µ+RZ GRHV RQH NQRZ ZKHQ LQWHUDFWLRQDO H[SHUWLVH ZLWK DXWLVWLF FXOWXUH
KDV EHHQ DFTXLUHG"¶ DVNs the important question of how one is to know when one has 
gained interactional expertise with autistic people and their culture, seen by Collins and 
Evans (2007) as a minimal requirement for social scientific research on cultural groups. This 
section revLHZVWKHXVHRIWKHµLPLWDWLRQJDPH¶DVGHYLVHGE\&ROOLQVDQG(YDQVDQ
DGDSWDWLRQRIWKH7XULQJ7HVWZKHUHWKHµMXGJH¶KDVWRGHFLGHEHWZHHQWZRSHRSOHRQHZKR
is a genuine member of a cultural group and who is an imposter. If such a game were to be 
played by social researchers in the field of autism studies, it would give an indication as to 
the level of interactional expertise gained, and whether interpretations by said researcher are 
OLNHO\WREHUHOHYDQWDQGDFFXUDWH7KHVHFWLRQµ/RVWLQWUDQVODWLRQ"¶DVNVZKHWKHURUQRWGXH
to embodied differences between autistic and nonautistic people, whether some level of 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJZLOODOZD\VEHµORVWLQWUDQVODWLRQ¶DQGZKHWKHUWKHµGRXEOHHPSDWK\SUREOHP¶
(Milton, 2012b) can be reduced and to what extent. The article finishes with some final 
remarks regarding the need for the involvement of autistic scholars in social research 
regarding autistic people, the increased use of participatory methods, and sets a challenge 
for social researchers working in this field. 
 
A framework to conceptualise expertise 
In recent decades, scholars in social theory have developed increasingly more sophisticated 
accounts of the nature of scientific expertise. This work explains how different claims to 
knowledge are defended by reference to different sorts of specialism or expertise. Collins 
and Evans (2007) in Rethinking Expertise VHWRXWDµSHULRGLFWDEOHRIH[SHUWLVH¶ based on the 
notion of socially located domains of tacit knowledge, that is, knowledge that cannot easily 
be made explicit or codified. This framework being predicated on a conceptual working 
model of loose boundaries between the categories stated. This conceptualisation was taken 
further in Tacit and Explicit Knowledge, in which Collins (2010) provides a conceptual 
language with which to analyse the acquisition of knowledge. 
 
Collins and Evans (2007) suggest that expertise is primarily based on the acquisition of tacit 
knowledge. In theorising tacit knowledge, they distinguish between ubiquitous and specialist 
expertise. Ubiquitous expertise includes an endless number of skills and knowledge that 
sustain the forms of life and culture of society (e.g. fluency in natural language or moral 
sensibility), whereas specialist expertise requires immersion in the language and practice of 
expert communities. Collins and Evans (2007) rank the acquisition of specialist knowledge 
on a VFDOHRIH[SHUWLVHUXQQLQJIURPµEHHU-PDWNQRZOHGJH¶, WKURXJKµSRSXODUXQGHUVWDQGLQJ¶
DQGµprimary source NQRZOHGJH¶DOOEHLQJknowledge which can be acquired from a base of 
ubiquitous tacit knowledge, before attaining µLQWHUDFWLRQDO¶DQGILQDOO\µFRQWULEXWRU\¶ expertise, 
which depend on the acquisition of specialist tacit knowledge. 
 
The differences between these categories of expertise are subtle, however, and relate to the 
availability of socialisation into practice communities. Specialist expertise can therefore be 
seen as a socially restricted form of socialisation (i.e. cultural learning dependent on being 
embedded in a specialist social practice), while the other forms of ubiquitous expertise are 
said to be available to all. When one applies such categorisations to the knowledge and 
expertise displayed by autistic people, things tend to look a bit different. Specialist expertise 
can certainly be found, not least with autistic culture, community and language (Arnold, 
2010; Lawson, 2008; Sinclair, 1993, 1999), yet more common forms of ubiquitous expertise 
are often deemed to be deficient or lacking due to cognitive deficit, such as the ability for 
µdynamic WKLQNLQJ¶*XVWHLQRUµFRJQLWLYHHPSDWK\¶ (Baron-Cohen, 2012). 
 
Following Wittgenstein, Collins and Evans (2007) argue that it is in the use of a concept 
which determines its meaning, thus understanding specialist meaning takes immersion in a 
way of life, rather than information gathering DORQH,QDFTXLULQJLQLWLDOµEHHU-PDW¶ knowledge 
or simple popular understandings, such deep immersion is not required, and as such the 
specialist ubiquitous expertise RIµRUGLQDU\SHRSOH¶should not be confused with the expertise 
of technical specialists within a particular domain of knowledge. The amount of interactional 
expertise achievable between autistic and non-autistic people, or how much these barriers 
are cultural, biological or whether such a distinction can be made (Hacking, 2009) has not 
been adequately µDQVZHUHG¶RULQYHVWLJDWHGWKURugh a sociological or contextualised lens in 
sufficient depth. As will be returned to later in this article, however, I argue that some level of 
interactional expertise must be possible, as no autistic person is completely 
uncommunicative. The interactional expertise shown by non-autistic social researchers is, 
however, often clearly insufficient, given the criticisms made of such investigations by 
autistic scholars (Arnold, 2012a; Milton and Bracher, 2013). Gaining expertise in what it is to 
be autistic would take immersion in the culture and practices of autistic people, yet it is 
questionable as to what extent such immersion is possible for non-autistic people and it is 
certainly doubtful that many established scientists have made the effort. Yet, for Collins and 
Evans (2007), interactional expertise should be seen as a basic standard for social scientific 
research. Such a gap in understanding can be seen as adding to the distrust and offence 
taken by autistic people to how µZH¶DVDJURXSDUHH[DPLQHGLQspected and interpreted by 
those of a non-autistic dispositionality; as Moon, a neurodiverse activist has stated, being 
µILVKERZOHG¶ (Milton and Moon, 2012a). It should also be remembered who the µFRQWULEXWRU\
H[SHUWV¶ DUH UHJDUGLQJ WKH FUHDWLRQ RI DXWLVWLF subjectivity and culture in the first place: 
autistic people themselves. Interactive expertise does not make someone an autistic person 
contributing to autistic culture, but someone more able to engage and interact with autistic 
language and communications. The involvement of autistic scholars in research and 
improvements in participatory methods can thus be seen as a requirement, if social research 
in the field of autism is to claim ethical and epistemological integrity. 
 
Claims to knowledge are of course linked to power and social closure (the restricting and 
privileging of social opportunities for one group of people at the expense of another) which 
influence the social valuing of various forms of specialist expertise (Rose, 1999). It is 
sometimes suggested in the case of autistic people, moreover, that an apparent inability to 
acquire basic forms of ubiquitous expertise lead autistic people to be unable to develop 
specialist expertise, even with reference to their own subjectivity and social positionality (e.g. 
Hendriks, 2012). Instead, expertise that is remarked upon as being achievable by some 
autistic people is seen in much non-autistic literature on the subject as residing in some kind 
of exotic other, ZLWKLQDGLVFRXUVHRIWKHH[WUDRUGLQDU\DXWLVWLFµVDYDQW¶ (Arnold, 2012b). Such 
a lack of social expertise and understanding has been called into question, however, by the 
initial emergence of autistic autobiographies, followed by autistic scholarship and the rise of 
advocacy organisations run by autistic people themselves (Autistic Rights Group Highland 
(ARGH), 2013; Autonomy, 2013; Autscape, 2013). It is of course true that not all autistic 
people are capable of such expressiveness, but a number of autistic people thought to have 
been incapable of communicating have found ways in which to do so (Wurzberg, 2011). 
 
Popular understandings 
Due to the specialised nature of expertise, Collins and Evans (2007) suggest that scientists 
must simplify their work in order to explain something of it to a professional audience, and 
even more for popular audiences: 
 
µ«LQ WKH FDVH RI GLVSXWHG VFLHQFH D OHYHO RI XQGHUVWDQGLQJ equivalent to popular 
understanding is likely to yield poor technical judgements.¶(Collins and Evans, 2007: 21). 
 
Popular understandings can lead to polarised reactions to scientific research. This can 
sometimes involve accepting a simplified version of evidence as truth and fact. We see this, 
for example, in the way that the idea of there being a theory of mind deficit in autism is now 
commonly GHSLFWHG DV µIDFWXDO¶ LQ SRSXOar literature, despite it being more accurately 
described as a working model or partial heuristic in the scientific world. Or it can involve the 
acceptance of claims without due thought. This is witnessed in the promotion of false 
conspiracy theories, as in the moral panic regarding vaccines and autism. For Collins and 
Evans (2007), such misinterpretations are strengthened by media representations of 
disputed science as something more revealing of knowledge being produced within a 
community of experts. One could also say, however, that popular misunderstandings are 
exacerbated by the claims of some academics themselves. The use of crude terms such as 
DQµH[WUHPHPDOHEUDLQ¶ with reference to autism in the scientific literature could clearly help 




The tendency discussed earlier for the scientific community to neglect the specific expertise 
of the autistic community is further exacerbated by the widely prevailing notion that autistic 
SHRSOH DUH VRPHKRZ µPDFKLQH-OLNH¶ or lacking in the socialisation necessary for effective 
communication. Asperger (1991) himself wrote that: 
 
µ7KHDXWLVWLVRQO\KLPVHOI« and is not an active member of a greater organism which he is 
influenced by and which he LQIOXHQFHVFRQVWDQWO\¶ (Asperger, 1991: 38) 
 
Approaches to the ontology of autism have been evolving ever since the phenomenon came 
into the clinical lexicon, yet the notion of the autistic person somehow being µPDFKLQH-OLNH¶
incapable of true socialisation, possessing µ]HUR GHJUHHV RI HPSDWK\¶ RU Kaving an 
impairment in their µVRFLDOEUDLQ¶%DUon-Cohen, 2012), has remained a repeated descriptive 
metaphor (Hendriks, 2012). 
 
Collins (2010) utilises the notion of strings as building blocks of signs and symbols, a 
physical object that only has an effect due to what happens to it. While language is 
conceptualised as a set of meanings located in society, strings are conceptualised as base 
objects that are the means by which language is inscribed and shared. Collins (2010) 
suggests that computers deal in strings and not language interpretation. No string has 
inherent meaning, as it is in linguistic interpretation that meaning is constructed and 
negotiated. Autistic people are often misinterpreted as only being able to deal in strings of 
information, as though they totally lacked a sociality and a language, or as though lacking 
meaning-making emotions. 
 
A recent example of this phenomenon is seen within the theory and practice of Relationship 
Development Intervention (Gustein, 2000), where autistic people are depicted as lacking 
µG\QDPLF WKLQNLQJ¶ and possessing LQVWHDG D VWUHQJWK LQ µVWDWLF WKLQNLQJ¶ (in other words, 
processing strings of information). Yet, autistic artwork 0XOOLQ  RU WKH µQRQ-YHUEDO¶
language expressed by 
Amanda Baggs (2007) is not reducible to strings alone in terms of how they are produced, 
but an engagement with the collective lifeworld of social life (i.e. learnt through some kind of 
sharing of social experiences). 
 
The implications of this prevailing misunderstanding of autistic socialisation are extensive. 
Collins and Evans (2007) suggest that there has been a general move towards seeing 
knowledge and ability as concerning embodied experience or else competence, that is, what 
RQH µGRHV¶ is what matteUV UDWKHU WKDQ MXVWZKDWVRPHRQHFDQ µUHSURGXFH¶ (cited in Collins 
and Evans, 2007). For Collins and Evans (2007), moreover, the primary site of the 
acquisition of knowledge and expertise is social, thus the mastering of a skill requires more 
than the embodiment of it, but the socialisation of people into relevant social practices. This, 
they say, is the difference between being able simply physically to balance on a bike and 
actually being able to negotiate traffic. Collins and Evans (2007) argue that polymorphic 
actions (actions that depend on context for interpretation and continuation and thus not 
reproducible by machines) require social understanding and flexibility to adapt actions to 
changing social contexts. This is the reason given by Collins and Evans (2007) to suggest 
why machines cannot replicate humans. If one is to believe current dominant ideologies 
regarding what autism is, then, it could also be argued that autistic people are machine-like, 
and unable to replicate appropriately the behaviours and understandings of non-disordered 
humans (at least without µLQWHUYHQWLRQ¶ There is clearly a need to correct this ideological 
error. Although processing of strings of information can be a strength found among many on 
the autism spectrum (Murray et al., 2005), not all autistic displays of knowledge and 
expertise can be explained away as highly honed mimeomorphic actions (actions performed 
in the same way each time and thus can be reproduced mechanically). With autistic people, 
especially those who acquire verbal DUWLFXODF\RQHRIWHQILQGV WKHVRFLDOLW\RIDQ µRXWVLGHU¶ 
(Becker, 1963), an alienated social identity, but a social identity nonetheless. Also, it is often 
said that one of the PRVW GHILQLQJ IHDWXUHV RI DXWLVP LV D µVSLN\¶ cognitive profile (Milton, 
2012c) that can lead to extreme strengths in areas of mimeomorphic actions, but also 
potentially a widening of perspective and a distinctive kind of sociality, particularly in later 
years of development. Such a sociality is often stigmatised (Milton, 2013b) rather than being 
seen as a potential asset within communities of practice. 
 
Autism and the acquisition of tacit knowledge 
What the argument so far demonstrates is that it is necessary to develop a clear account of 
the kinds of knowledge that autistic people may be able to acquire and to reject misplaced 
assumptions which prevent us from doing just that. In his conception of the acquisition of 
tacit knowledge, Collins (2010) demarcates three main categories: weak/relational, 
medium/somatic and strong/collective. Weak relational tacit knowledge arises from social 
interaction, yet any piece of it in principle can be made explicit. Collins (2010) gives the 
example of an experienced warehouseman who can find specific objects within a 
warehouse, yet would not be able to list every object; however, one could program a 
computer to do just this task. At times, knowledge that can be made explicit is not due to 
DFFLGHQWODFNRIWLPHRUDV&ROOLQVLQGLFDWHVµmismatched VDOLHQFHV¶ 
 
For Collins (2010), somatic tacit knowledge is knowledge that can be explained or written 
down but cannot be used in a pragmatic way by humans due to the limitations of their bodies 
WKHLUµVRPDWLFDIIRUGDQFHV¶). Such knowledge can in principle be made explicit, yet may be 
very difficult to do so. Machines of the right design may be able to apply such knowledge 
due to differing somatic affordance (e.g. machines can compute mathematical sums far 
quicker than humans can). Somatic-affordance tacit knowledge can only be performed and 
applied as actions in practice due to the affordances of the materials from which a body or 
entity is made. In this respect, the limit is not explicability but embodiment. Strong or 
collective tacit knowledge, as defined by Collins (2010), can only be acquired through 
immersion in the language and practices of society and is conceptualised as a property of 
society. In this conceptualisation, individuals DUH VHHQ DV µSDUDVLWLF¶ on the body of social 
knowledge (or needing to draw upon social experiences to form tacit knowledge). This ability 
WREHµSDUDVLWLF¶ on the social body is a unique property of humans, as neither other animals 
nor machines are capable of such collective knowledge acquisition. The term used by 
Collins (2010) to identify this split LVµ6RFLDO&DUWHVLDQLVP¶ 
 
An interesting example utilised by Collins (2010) is the description of a scene from Star Trek: 
The Next Generation regarding the character of Lt Commander Data, a character often 
described as being representative of an autistic persona. In the scene, Data was able to 
learn dance steps to a routine without difficulty, and then in time was able to improvise 
dance steps of his own. Collins (2010) rightly points out that a machine would not be capable 
of improvisation. Yet, as an example, if I were to be placed in such a situation, it would be 
virtually impossible for me to enact a set dance routine, but I would have no trouble at all in 
improvising one, whether such a dance would win any awards in the eyes of others is 
debatable though. Collins (2010) points out that domesticated animals, while immersed in 
human society, are not able to be socialised, in the sense one does not encounter 
vegetarian, arty or nerdy dogs, they are simply just dogs. This sociality is often said to be 
impaired in autistic people, even mentioned by Collins (2011) when using as an example of 
the autistic savant who appears to manage their performances in the absence of collective 
tacit knowledge, with this absence seeming to be a principal feature of the autistic lifeworld. 
Yet, one does encounter autistic people who are vegetarian, artistic and certainly nerdy. 
Autistic people have distinct interests and abilities that involve social practices, and this 
LQFOXGHV WKRVHZKRDUHGHHPHG µQRQ-YHUEDO¶ who are often musical or artistic and whose 
bodily movements have been argued to be a form of language (Baggs, 2007, Milton, 2013a). 
 
If autistic people are primarily machine-like, then where do the idiosyncratic expressions of 
autistic people (Mullin, 2009) originate? If one were to follow the theory of Murray et al. 
(2005), perhaps it is the affordances of an autistic mind-set leading to the honing-in on 
particular aspects of the social which inspire interest and attention ± a monotropic social 
being, with a fragmented experience of the social. Indeed, if artificial intelligence is one day 
produced, it may perform similarly to an autistic person, but this performance may contain a 
liking for unusual improvisation: 
 
µWhat is being argued is that humans differ from animals, trees, and sieves in having a 
unique capacity to absorb social rules from the surrounding society ± rules that change from 
place to place, circumstance to circumstance, and time to time.¶ (Collins, 2010: 124). 
 
Autistic people are often taughWVRFLDO µUXOHV¶DV LI WKH\ are more fixed and static than they 
actually are in lived reality, which only causes more confusion. Much social skill or 
behavioural training with autistic people is predicated upon breaking down such information 
into explicated strings of information, which does little to help autistic people adjust to the 
changing flux of negotiated socially constructed realities (Milton, 2012b). By the use of such 
methods, autistic people have their fragmented social perceptions reinforced via the very 
ZD\ µVRFLDO VNLOOV¶ are being taught. Recently, however, methods such as Intensive 
Interaction (Nind and Hewitt, 1994), which focus on relationship building and child-led 
activities, have begun to challenge this dominance within the field. 
 
How does one know when interactional expertise with autistic culture has been 
acquired? 
Following the argument presented here, one of the primary tasks facing those attempting to 
work with autistic people or to analyse the nature of autism is to appreciate the distinctive 
knowledge autistic people possess and to build more constructive ways of relating to it. As 
Hacking (2009) puts it:  
 
µThey are creating the language in which to describe the experience of autism, and hence 
helping to forge the concepts in which to think autism.¶+DFNLQJ1467) 
 
Over the past two decades, there has been the growth of a variety of autistic communities, 
both online and in conferences run by and for autistic people, such as Autscape (2013). 
Following the insights of Collins and Evans (2007), in order to study such a social group, 
interactional expertise is needed. The amount of interactional expertise and understanding of 
autistic culture exhibited by social researchers in the field, however, has often left a great 
deal to be desired (Arnold, 2012a). Misrepresentations of autistic culture are widespread 
within current literature and have hampered progress in the field (Milton and Bracher, 2013). 
When autistic people have been involved in research, this has often added much to the work 
produced, as the recent work of the Autism Education Trust demonstrates (Wittemeyer et al., 
2011; Wittemeyer et al., 2012). 
 
Collins (2004) argues that interactional expertise can simply be seen in the ways an 
individual can interact within a practice community, and that it is a quality utilised by 
specialist journalists and championed by interpretive social scientific methods (Collins et al., 
2006), a form of UHDOLVW SUDJPDWLF µYHUVWHKHQ¶ (an understanding of the intentions and 
motives behind the actions of others). In order to test the level of interactional expertise one 
has ZLWKDQRXWVLGHUJURXSWRRQH¶VRZQ&ROOLQVHWDO devised an alternative to the 
Turing test, known as the µLPLWDWLRQ JDPH¶ &ROOLQV HW DO (2006) suggested that imitation 
games investigate the specific linguistic abilities of interactional experts, contributory experts 
and non-experts. These experiments utilise three computers linked via a wireless network 
with specialist software. Judges who are contributory experts type questions to the other 
participants, probing for possession of expertise. One participant is genuine and the other is 
someone without contributory expertise. After each question, the judge makes a guess with 
a confidence level associated with the guess. The session continues until the judge feels 
there is nothing left to be gained by continuing. Interactional expertise is purported to be 
demonstrated whenever the proportion of correct guesses is greater than that which would 
have been achieved by chance alone. The confidence levels of guesses are split into the 
following four levels: 
 
Level 1: I have little or no idea who is who. 
Level 2: I have some idea who is who ± but I am more unsure than I am sure. 
Level 3: I have a good idea who is who ± and I am more sure than unsure. 
Level 4: I am pretty sure I know who is who. 
 
Guesses at level 3 or 4 of confidence are scored as either correct or incorrect, while all 
guesses right or wrong at levels 1 and 2 are counted as being uncertain. Whenever judges 
change their level of confidence, they are asked as to why this is the case. A second phase 
to the test is then to send the dialogues contained to a set of more judges. 
 
Imitation game experiments conducted by Collins et al. (2006) show that those well 
socialised into the language of a specialist group are linguistically indistinguishable from 
those with full practical socialisation, yet distinguishable from those who are not well 
socialised into such specialised discourses. Thus, tacit knowledge of specialist languages 
can be acquired without having the tacit knowledge associated with the practices of 
specialist cultures to the level of contributory expertise. 
 
If one were to apply the methodology of imitation games within the field of autism studies, a 
number of issues would need to be taken into account, such as general linguistic ability, 
potential personal connections between judge and participant, asking autistic people to 
potentially lie and so on. Having said this, they would no doubt yield interesting results. 
Would academics, practitioners and even parents be able to pass such a test in pretending 
to be autistic? Would social theorists who write about the autistic community and the 
neurodiversity movement be able to pass as a self-advocate? Such a test would give some 
indication as to the level of interactional expertise gained, and whether interpretations of 
autistic communities and culture can be said to be relevant and accurate depictions. 
 
Lost in translation? 
Interactional expertise can be seen as an important step towards mutual understanding, yet 
in the case of interactions between autistic and non-autistic people, is something always 
JRLQJ WREH µORVW LQ WUDQVODWLRQ¶? When differences in disposition and social understandings 
have foundations in neurological diversity, how much interactional expertise is possible? Is 
some level of expertise in what it is to be autistic on a phenomenological level of lived 
experience always beyond the grasp of non-autistic social scientific researchers? It could be 
said that autism is a state-specific expertise (Collins and Evans, 2007). Is the somatic 
DIIRUGDQFH WKH OLPLWDWLRQV RI RQH¶s physiology) of an autistic bodily state a necessary 
condition for interactional expertise regarding autistic subjectivity? If this is the case, then 
interactional expertise between autistic and non-autistic people would always be constrained 
and partial at best. Both the philosophers Nagel (1974/1981) and Wittgenstein (cited in 
Collins and Evans, 2007) wrote thought experiments regarding the possibility of 
understanding what it would be like to be an animal (other than human). Nagel (1974/1981) 
DVNHG WKH TXHVWLRQ µ:KDW LV LW OLNH WR EH D %DW"¶ ZKLOH :LWWJHQVWHLQ FLWHG LQ &ROOLQV DQG 
Evans, 2007) asked the TXHVWLRQ µIf a Lion could speak, would a human being be able to 
XQGHUVWDQGLW"¶ The conclusions of these thought experiments were that it was impossible to 
FRQFHSWXDOLVH RI VXFK DQ µRWKHU¶, and to UHPRYH RQHVHOI IURP RQH¶s own perceptions and 
somatic (embodied) limitations. So, if the somatic affordances of autistic and non-autistic 
people are significantly different, is understanding the autistic lifeworld in the perceptions of 
a non-autistic onlooker a more nuanced version of understanding the perception of a bat or 
attempting to speak µ/LRQHVH¶DQGYLFHYHUVD" This difficulty is exacerbated by what might 
EHFDOOHGWKHµGRXEOHHPSDWK\SUREOHP¶ (Milton, 2012b). Collins (2004) wrote that: 
 
µCertainly, almost everything I write, and that includes the straightforward pieces, seems 
open to astonishing misinterpretatioQE\DWOHDVWDIHZSHRSOH¶ (Collins, 2004: 105) 
 
While Collins (2004) was referring to the way in which his own writings are misinterpreted, 
such a breakdown in communication is a daily experience for autistic people (Milton 2013b). 
The autistic form of life does not conform to assumed social normativity and does not easily 
extend RXWZDUG LQWR WKH VRFLDO OHDGLQJ WR D µdouble empathy SUREOHP¶EHWZHHQ SHRSOH Rf 
diverse dispositions (Milton, 2012b), that is, both parties struggle to understand and relate to 
one another. Such differences in presentation can lead to dyspathic reactions (Cameron, 
2012) and stigma (Milton, 2013b), often leading to ill-fated attempts at normalisation and a 
continuing vicious cycle of psycho-emotional disablement (Milton and Moon, 2012b). 
 
Collins and Evans (2007) put forward a minimal embodiment thesis and social embodiment 
thesis to the acquisition of knowledge. Yet, when brains do operate differently and affect 
social embodiment, a double empathy problem ensues easily. Reaching interactional 
expertise may be blocked by embodied differences of somatic affordance. Yet, for all the 
language and rhetoric of being IURPDµGLIIHUHQWSODQHW¶RU IHHOLQJ OLNHDQµDQWKURSRORJLst on 
PDUV¶ DXWLVWLF SHRSOH UHPDLQ ERWK KXPDQ DQG VRFLDO albeit idiosyncratically, with diverse 
experiences of socialisation, or the lack of access into communities of practice to be 
immersed in. Such a lack of access to communities of practice can also lead to social 
isolation and anomie and negative consequences for individual mental and physical well-
being (Milton and Moon, 2012b). Indeed, the construction RI DQRWKHU µVLOR¶ OLQJXLVWLF
community of experts) of the neurodiversity movement can be seen as an attempt to break 
GRZQ WKH µVLOR PHQWDOLW\¶ LWVHOI $UQROG  Milton, 2012d) within the study of autism. 
Thankfully, there are now the beginnings of a more concerted effort from researchers, both 
autistic and nonautistic, to improve the participatory nature of the research agenda (Milton et 
al. 2012; Milton and Bracher 2013; Pellicano, 2012, Pellicano et al., 2013). Yet, difficulties 
remain even if the effort is made. 
 
In the field of autism studies, little produces more GHEDWHWKDQFODLPVDVWRµZKR can speak 
IRUDXWLVWLFSHRSOH¶ (Pellicano, 2012; Rudavsky, 2011). All stakeholder groups make differing 
claims to specialist contributory knowledge, but working within differing communities of 
practice with differing frames of reference. One could speculate that the sociological 
awareness of many neuroscientists VWXG\LQJ DXWLVP FRXOG IDLO DW WKH µEHHU-PDW¶ FKDOOHQJH
and vice versa, given the ever-increasing specialism inherent in academic training. As 
Collins (2010) put it: 
 
µDevelopmental psychology offers valuable insights into the processes humans go through 
as they become parasites on collective tacit knowledge but the explanation is far from 
FRPSOHWH¶ (Collins, 2010: 145) 
 
The mutual incomprehension that Collins (2011) talks about as a potential consequence of 
the lack of the centrality RIODQJXDJHDQGKXPDQVDVµVRFLDOSDUDVLWHV¶ is exactly what often 
happens in interactions between autistic and non-autistic people, even when verbal skills 
have been gained. In order to build bridges and practice languages, at the very least, autistic 
people need to be listened to (Milton et al. 2012; Milton and Bracher 2013; Pellicano, 2012; 
Pellicano et al., 2013): 
 
µIndeed, it is hard to see why mutual incomprehension would not go right down to the level of 
individual personal experience.¶ (Collins, 2011: 283) 
 
Final remarks 
According to the minimal embodiment thesis of Collins and Evans (2007) regarding 
interactional expertise, people who cannot perform a particular task or skill, and who 
therefore cannot have the embodied expertise associated with it, can still talk about that skill 
as if they did possess the embodied skills. Interactional expertise thus raises a key question 
about the level of embodiment that is needed for expertise to be transferred. For proponents 
of the embodiment thesis, quite a lot of embodiment is required, yet from the perspective of 
Collins and Evans (2007), much less embodiment is generally needed:  
 
µThe claim associated with the idea of interactional expertise is that mastery of an entire form 
of life is not necessary for the mastery of the language pertaining to the form of life. This is a 
big cODLPDQGQHHGVVWURQJSURRI¶ (Collins and Evans, 2007: 77) 
 
The somatic affordance of autistic and non-autistic dispositions may well create a large 
double empathy problem (Milton, 2012b), where both have a difficulty in understanding the 
QXDQFHV RI RQH DQRWKHU¶s perception and sociality. To what extent can anyone immerse 
themselves in the language and culture of the other? At least some must be the answer, as 
DXWLVWLF SHRSOH DUH QRW µDOLHQV¶ despite the popular use of the term within autistic culture. 
Such an immersion can also be said to be the inspiration of approaches to the education of 
autistic people that have a more child-led focus (Milton, 2012c): 
 
µThe position argued here is that you do not have to use your body (acquire contributory 
expertise) in order to speak the language of the domain (acquire interactional expertise)«¶ 
(Collins and Evans, 2007: 78) 
 
This is a debatable position, however, if one considers DXWLVWLFODQJXDJHFDQEHµQRQ-YHUEDO¶ 
and based upon bodily movements and sensations (Baggs, 2007, Milton, 2012a). In my 
view, the level of embodiment needed for interactional expertise with autistic people remains 
unanswered, yet the imitation game experiments devised by Collins and Evans (2007) may 
provide a starting point by which this topic could be explored further. It must also be 
remembered who, in this conceptualisation, are the contributory experts regarding autistic 
subjectivity and culture, for this does take embodiment ± that is, autistic people themselves. 
 
In the history of autism studies, expertise has been claimed by many differing academic 
schools of thought, practitioners, parents, quacks and so on. Yet, the one voice that has 
been traditionally silenced within the field is that of autistic people themselves. Due to a lack 
of interactional expertise with autistic communities (Arnold, 2012b; Milton and Bracher, 
2013), one could say a negative spiral has ensued. Consequently, autistic people have often 
become distrustful of researchers and their aims and are frozen out of processes of 
knowledge production (Milton et al., 2012). Such a context results in a lack of interactional 
expertise between researchers and autistic people and a breakdown in trust and 
communication (Milton, 2012b) leading to an increase in tension between stakeholder 
groups (Milton, 2011). 
 
Finally, it is hoped that those wanting to research the sociality of autistic people may take up 
the challenge of an imitation game. 
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